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Abstract NTRUSign is the most practical lattice signature scheme. Its
basic version was broken by Nguyen and Regev in 2006: one can efficiently
recover the secret key from about 400 signatures. However, countermea-
sures have been proposed to repair the scheme, such as the perturbation
used in NTRUSign standardization proposals, and the deformation pro-
posed by Hu et al. at IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory in 2008. These two
countermeasures were claimed to prevent the NR attack. Surprisingly, we
show that these two claims are incorrect by revisiting the NR gradient-
descent attack: the attack is more powerful than previously expected, and
actually breaks both countermeasures in practice, e.g. 8,000 signatures
suffice to break NTRUSign-251 with one perturbation as submitted to
IEEE P1363 in 2003. More precisely, we explain why the Nguyen-Regev
algorithm for learning a parallelepiped is heuristically able to learn more
complex objects, such as zonotopes and deformed parallelepipeds.
1 Introduction
There is growing interest in cryptography based on hard lattice problems (see
the survey [22]). The field started with the seminal work of Ajtai [2] back in
1996, and recently got a second wind with Gentry’s breakthrough work [7] on
fully-homomorphic encryption. It offers asymptotical efficiency, potential resis-
tance to quantum computers and new functionalities. There has been significant
progress in provably-secure lattice cryptography in the past few years, but from
a practical point of view, very few lattice schemes can compete with standard-
ized schemes for now. This is especially true in the case of signature schemes, for
which there is arguably only one realistic lattice alternative: NTRUSign [11],
which is an optimized instantiation of the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH)
signature scheme [9] using the compact lattices introduced in NTRU encryp-
tion [14] and whose performances are comparable with ECDSA. By comparison,
signatures have size beyond 10,000 bits (at 80-bit security level) for the most effi-
cient provably-secure lattice signature scheme known, namely the recent scheme
of Lyubashevsky [19].
However, NTRUSign has no provable-security guarantee. In fact, the GGH
signature scheme and its simplest NTRUSign instantiation were broken at EU-
ROCRYPT ’06 by Nguyen and Regev [23], who presented a polynomial-time
key-recovery attack using a polynomial number of signatures: in the case of
NTRUSign, 400 signatures suffice in practice to disclose the secret key within
a few hours. In the GGH design, a signature is a lattice point which is rel-
atively close to the (hashed) message. Clearly, many lattice points could be
valid signatures, but GGH selects one which is closely related to the secret key:
each message–signature pair actually discloses a sample almost uniformly dis-
tributed in a secret high-dimensional parallelepiped. The NR attack works by
learning such a parallelepiped: given a polynomial number of samples of the form∑n
i=1 xibi where the xi’s are picked uniformly at random from [−1, 1] and the
secret vectors b1, . . . ,bn ∈ Rn are linearly independent, the attack recovers the
parallelepiped basis (b1, . . . ,bn), by finding minima of a certain multivariate
function, thanks to a well-chosen gradient descent. The NR attack motivated
the search of countermeasures to repair NTRUSign:
– The very first countermeasure already appeared in half of the parameter
choices of NTRU’s IEEE P1363.1 standardization proposal [17], the other
half being broken by NR. It consists of applying the signature generation
process twice, using two different NTRU lattices, the first one being kept
secret: here, the secret parallelepiped becomes the Minkowski sum of two
secret parallelepipeds, which is a special case of zonotopes. This slows down
signature generation, and forces to increase parameters because the signature
obtained is less close to the message. However, no provable security guarantee
was known or even expected. In fact, heuristic attacks have been claimed
by both the designers of NTRUSign [10] and more recently by Malkin et
al. [20], but both are impractical: the most optimistic estimates [10,20] state
that they both require at least 260 signatures, and none have been fully
implemented. Yet, as a safety precaution, the designers of NTRUSign [10]
only claim the security of NTRUSign with perturbation up to 1 million
signatures in [11]. Still, breaking this countermeasure was left as an open
problem in [23].
– In 2008, Hu, Wang and He [16] proposed a simpler and faster countermeasure
in IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, which we call IEEE-IT, where the secret
parallelepiped is deformed. Again, the actual security was unknown.
– Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [8] proposed the first provably secure
countermeasure for GGH signatures, by using a randomized variant [18] of
Babai’s nearest plane algorithm. However, this slows down signature gener-
ation significantly, and forces to increase parameters because the signatures
obtained are much less close to the message. As a result, the resulting sig-
nature for NTRUSign does not seem competitive with classical signatures:
no concrete parameter choice has been proposed.
Our Results. We revisit the Nguyen-Regev gradient-descent attack to show
that it is much more powerful than previously expected: in particular, an opti-
mized NR attack can surprisingly break in practice both NTRU’s perturbation
technique [11] as recommended in standardization proposals [17,13], and the
IEEE-IT countermeasure [16]. For instance, we can recover the NTRUSign se-
cret key in a few hours, using 8,000 signatures for the original NTRUSign-251
scheme with one perturbation submitted to IEEE P1363 standardization in 2003,
or only 5,000 signatures for the latest 80-bit-security parameter set [13] proposed
in 2010. These are the first successful experiments fully breaking NTRUSign
with countermeasures. Note that in the perturbation case, we have to slightly
modify the original NR attack. The warning is clear: our work strongly suggests
to dismiss all GGH/NTRUSign countermeasures which are not supported by
some provable security guarantee.
Our work sheds new light on the NR attack. The original analysis of Nguyen
and Regev does not apply to any of the two NTRUSign countermeasures, and
it seemed a priori that the NR attack would not work in these cases. We show
that the NR attack is much more robust than anticipated, by extending the
original analysis of the Nguyen-Regev algorithm for learning a parallelepiped,
to tackle more general objects such as zonotopes (to break the NTRUSign
countermeasure with a constant number of perturbations) or deformed paral-
lelepipeds (to break the IEEE-IT countermeasure). For instance, in the zonotope
case, the parallelepiped distribution
∑n
i=1 xibi is replaced by
∑m
i=1 xivi where
v1, . . . ,vm ∈ Rn are secret vectors with m ≥ n. The key point of the NR attack
is that all the local minima of a certain multivariate function are connected to
the directions bi’s of the secret parallelepiped. We show that there is somewhat
a similar (albeit more complex) phenomenon when the parallelepiped is replaced
by zonotopes or deformed parallelepipeds: there, we establish the existence of
local minima connected to the secret vectors spanning the object, but we can-
not rule out the existence of other minima. Yet, the attack works very well in
practice, as if there were no other minima.
Roadmap. In Sect. 2, we recall background on NTRUSign and the NR attack.
In Sect. 3, we attack NTRU’s perturbation countermeasure, by learning a zono-
tope. In Sect. 4, we attack the IEEE-IT countermeasure, by learning a deformed
parallelepiped. More information is provided in the full version [5].
2 Background and Notation
2.1 Notation
Sets. Zq is the ring of integers modulo q. N and Z denote the usual sets. [n]
denotes {1, · · · , n}. Sn is the unit sphere of Rn for the Euclidean norm ‖.‖,
whose inner product is 〈, 〉.
Linear Algebra. Vectors of Rn will be row vectors denoted by bold lowercase
letters. A (row) matrix is denoted by [b1, . . . ,bn]. We denote by Mm,n(R) the
set of m×n matrices over a ring R. The group of n×n invertible matrices with
real coefficients will be denoted by GLn(R) and On(R) will denote the subgroup
of orthogonal matrices. The transpose of a matrix M will be denoted by M t,
and M−t will mean the inverse of the transpose. For a set S of vectors in Rn
and M ∈Mn,m(R), S ·M denotes the set {s ·M : s ∈ S}. We denote by In the
n× n identity matrix.
Rounding. We denote by dxc the closest integer to x. Naturally, dbc denotes the
operation applied to all the coordinates of b.
Distributions. If X is a random variable, we denote by E[X] its expectation. For
any set S, we denote by U(S) the uniform distribution over S, when applicable.
If D is a distribution over Rn, its covariance is the n × n symmetric positive
matrix Cov(D) = Ex←D [xtx]. The notation D ⊕ D′ denotes the convolution of
two distributions, that is the distribution of x + y where x ← D and y ← D′
are sampled independently. Furthermore, we denote by D ·B the distribution of
xB where x← D.
Zonotopes and Parallelepipeds. A zonotope is the Minkowski sum of finitely
many segments. Here, we use centered zonotopes: the zonotope spanned by an
m×n row matrix V = [v1, . . . ,vm] is the set Z(V ) = {
∑m
i=1 xivi,−1 ≤ xi ≤ 1}.
We denote by DZ(V ) the convolution distribution over Z(V ) obtained by pick-
ing independently each xi uniformly at random from [−1, 1]n: in other words,
DZ(V ) = U([−1, 1]n) · V , which in general is not the uniform distribution over
Z(V ). However, in the particular case V ∈ GLn(R), Z(V ) is simply the paral-
lelepiped P(V ) spanned by V , and DP(V ) is equal to the uniform distribution
over P(V ).
Differentials. Let f be a function from Rn to R. The gradient of f at w ∈ Rn is
denoted by ∇f(w) = ( ∂f∂x1 (w), . . . ,
∂f
∂xn
(w)). The Hessian matrix of f at w ∈ Rn




Running Times. All given running times were measured using a 2.27-GHz Intel
Xeon E5520 core.
Lattices. We refer to the survey [24] for a bibliography on lattices. In this paper,
by the term lattice, we mean a full-rank discrete subgroup of Rn. A non-empty
set L ⊆ Rn is a lattice if and only if there exists B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ GLn(R) such
that L = {∑ni=1 nibi | ni ∈ Z} . Any such B is called a basis of L, and the
absolute value of its determinant is the lattice volume vol(L) of the lattice L.
The closest vector problem (CVP) is the following: given a basis of L ⊆ Zn and
a target t ∈ Qn, find a lattice vector v ∈ L minimizing the distance ‖v − t‖. If
d is the minimal distance, then approximating CVP to a factor k means finding
v ∈ L such that ‖v − t‖ ≤ kd. Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) is a special
case of CVP where the distance to the lattice is known to be small.
2.2 The GGH Signature Scheme
The GGH scheme [9] works with a lattice L in Zn. The secret key is a non-
singular matrix R ∈ Mn(Z), with very short row vectors. Following [21], the
public key is the Hermite normal form (HNF) of L. The messages are hashed
onto a “large enough” subset of Zn, for instance a large hypercube. Let m ∈ Zn
be the hash of the message to be signed. The signer applies Babai’s round-off
CVP approximation algorithm [3] to get a lattice vector close to m:
s = bmR−1eR, (1)
so that s−m ∈ 12P(R). To verify the signature s of m, one checks that s ∈ L
using the public basis B, and that the distance ‖s−m‖ is sufficiently small.
2.3 NTRUSign
Basic scheme. NTRUSign [11] is an instantiation of GGH using the compact
lattices from NTRU encryption [14], which we briefly recall: we refer to [11,4] for
more details. In the former NTRU standards [4] proposed to IEEE P1363.1 [17],
N = 251 and q = 128. Let R be the ring Z[X]/(XN − 1) whose multiplication is
denoted by ∗. One computes (f, g, F,G) ∈ R4 such that f ∗G− g ∗ F = q in R
and f is invertible mod q, where f and g have 0–1 coefficients (with a prescribed
number of 1), while F and G have slightly larger coefficients, yet much smaller
than q. This quadruplet is the NTRU secret key. Then the secret basis is the













a1 · · · aN−1 a0
,
and fi denotes the coefficient of X
i of the polynomial f . Thus, the lattice di-
mension is n = 2N . Due to the special structure of R, a single row of R is
sufficient to recover the whole secret key. Because f is chosen invertible mod q,
the polynomial h = g/f mod q is well-defined in R: this is the NTRU public
key. Its fundamental property is that f ∗ h ≡ g mod q in R. The polynomial






implies that the lattice volume is qN .
The messages are assumed to be hashed in {0, . . . , q − 1}2N . Let m be such
a hash. We write m = (m1,m2) with mi ∈ {0, . . . , q − 1}N . The signature is
the vector (s, t) ∈ Z2N which would have been obtained by applying Babai’s
round-off CVP approximation algorithm to m, except that it is computed more
efficiently using convolution products and can even be compressed (see [11]). We
described the basic NTRUSign scheme [11], as used in half of the parameter
choices of the former NTRU standards [4].
Perturbations. The second half of parameter choices of NTRU standards [4]
use perturbation techniques [10,4,12] to strengthen security, which are described
in Sect. 2.5. But there is a second change: instead of the standard NTRU secret
key, one uses the so-called transpose basis, which is simply Rt, then the public
basis remains the same, except that one defines the public key as h = F/f = G/g
mod q rather than h = g/f mod q.
New parameters. In the latest NTRU article [13], new parameters forNTRUSign
have been proposed. These include different values of (N, q) and a different shape
for f and g: the coefficients of f and g are now in {0,±1}, rather than {0, 1}
like in [11]. But the scheme itself has not changed.
2.4 The Nguyen-Regev Attack
We briefly recall the Nguyen-Regev attack [23], using a slightly different presen-
tation. The NR attack solves the following idealized problem:
Problem 1 (The Hidden Parallelepiped Problem or HPP) Let V = [v1,
. . . ,vn] ∈ GLn(R) and let P(V ) = {
∑n
i=1 xivi : xi ∈ [−1, 1]} be the parallelepiped
spanned by V . The input to the HPP is a sequence of poly(n) independent sam-
ples from the uniform distribution DP(V ). The goal is to find a good approxima-
tion of the rows of ±V .
In practice, instead of samples from DP(V ), the attack uses 2(s−m) for all given
message-signature pairs (m, s): this distribution is heuristically close to DP(V )
where R is the secret basis. To recover rows of R, the attack simply rounds
the approximations found to integer vectors. The NR attack has two stages:
morphing and minimization.
Morphing the Parallelepiped into a Hypercube. The first stage of the NR attack
is to transform the hidden parallelepiped into a hidden hypercube (see Alg. 1),
using a suitable linear transformation L. It is based on the following elementary
lemma [23, Lemmas 1 and 2]:
Lemma 1. Let V ∈ GLn(R) and denote by G ∈ GLn(R) the symmetric positive
definite matrix V tV . Then:
– Cov(DP(V )) = G/3.
– If L ∈ GLn(R) satisfies LLt = G−1 and we let C = V L, then C ∈ On(R)
and DP(V ) · L = DP(C).
Algorithm 1 Morphing(X ): Morphing a Parallelepiped into a Hybercube
Input: A set X of vectors x ∈ Rn sampled from the uniform distribution DP(V ) over
a parallelepiped.
Output: A matrix L such that DP(V ) · L is close to DP(C) for some C ∈ On(R).
1: Compute an approximation G of V tV using the set X , using Cov(DP(V )) = V tV/3
(see Lemma 1).
2: Return L such that LLt = G−1
This stage is exactly (up to scaling) the classical preprocessing used in indepen-
dent component analysis to make covariance equal to the identity matrix:
Lemma 2. Let G be the covariance matrix of a distribution D over Rn. If L ∈
GLn(R) satisfies LLt = G−1, then Cov(D · L) = In.
Learning a Hypercube. The second stage of the NR attack is to solve the hidden
hypercube problem, using minimization with a gradient descent (see Alg. 2).
Nguyen and Regev [23] showed that for any V ∈ On(R), if D denotes the distri-
bution DP(V ):
– The function momD,4(w) = Ex←D[〈x,w〉4] has exactly 2n local minima
over the unit sphere Sn, which are located at ±v1, · · · ,±vn, and are global
minima.
– It is possible to find all minima of momD,4(·) over Sn in random polynomial
time, using Alg. 2 with parameter δ = 3/4, thanks to the nice shape of
momD,4(·). Alg. 2 is denoted by Descent(X ,w, δ) which, given a point w ∈
Sn, performs a suitable gradient descent using the sample set X , and returns
an approximation of some ±vi.
Algorithm 2 Descent(X ,w, δ): Solving the Hidden Hypercube Problem by
Gradient Descent
Input: A set X of samples from the distribution DP(V ) where V ∈ On(R), a vector w
chosen uniformly at random from Sn and a descent parameter δ.
Output: An approximation of some row of ±V .
1: Compute an approximation g of the gradient ∇momV,4(w) using X .
2: Let wnew = w − δg.
3: Divide wnew by its Euclidean norm ‖wnew‖.
4: if momV,4(wnew) ≥ momV,4(w) where the moments are approximated using X
then
5: return the vector w.
6: else
7: Replace w by wnew and go back to Step 1.
8: end if
The whole NR attack is summarized by Alg. 3.
Algorithm 3 SolveHPP(X ): Learning a Parallelepiped [23]
Input: A set X of vectors x ∈ Rn sampled from DP(V ), where V ∈ GLn(R)
Output: An approximation of a random row vector of ±V
1: L := Morphing(X ) using Alg. 1
2: X := X · L
3: Pick w uniformly at random from Sn
4: Compute r := Descent(X ,w, δ) ∈ Sn using Alg. 2: use δ = 3/4 in theory and
δ = 0.7 in practice.
5: Return rL−1
Shrinking the number of NTRUSign-signatures. In practice, the NR attack
requires a polynomial number of signatures, but it is possible to experimentally
decrease this amount by a linear factor [23], using a well-known symmetry of
NTRU lattices. We define the NTRUSign symmetry group SNTRUN as the group
spanned by σ ∈ On(R) : (x1, . . . xN |y1, · · · yN ) 7→ (x2, . . . xN , x1|y2, · · · yN , y1).
If L is the NTRU lattice, then σ(L) = L. Furthermore, (σ(m), σ(s)) follows
the same distribution as uniformly random (m, s). So, any pair (m, s) gives rise
to N parallelepiped samples. This technique also allows a N -factor speedup for
covariance computation, which is the most time consuming part of the attack.
2.5 Countermeasures
NTRUSign perturbation: Summing Parallelepipeds. Roughly speaking, these
techniques perturbates the hashed message m before signing it with the NTRU
secret basis. More precisely, the hashed message m is first signed using a second
NTRU secret basis (of another NTRU lattice, which is kept secret), and the
resulting signature is then signed as before. Heuristically, the effect on the sample
distribution of the transcript is as follows: if R and R′ are the two secret bases,
the distribution of s−m becomes the convolution P(R)⊕P(R′), i.e. a natural
distribution over the Minkowski sum of the two parallelepipeds obtained by
adding the uniform distributions of both parallelepipeds.
IEEE-IT perturbation: Parallelepiped Deformation. Hu et al. [16] suggested an-
other approach to secure NTRUSign in the journal IEEE Trans. IT. Their
definition are specific to NTRUSign-bases, but it can be generalized to GGH,
and we call this technique “Parallelepiped deformation”. Let δ : [-1/2, 1/2)n → Zn








mR−1 − ⌈mR−1⌋) )R (2)
If δ outputs small integer vectors, then the signature s is still valid. The associ-
ated deformation function is dδ(x) = x+ δ(x). The sample distribution of s−m
is deformed in the following way : dδ(Un) ·R where dδ(Un) denotes the distribu-
tion of x+ δ(x) with x← Un. In [16], the deformation δIEEE for a NTRUSign
secret key (f, g, F,G) is as follows:
– Let U ⊂ [N ] be the set of indexes u such that the u-th entry of f+g+F +G
is 1 modulo 2, and let A = #U . On the average, A ≈ N/2, and it is assumed
that A ≥ 25, otherwise a new secret key must be generated.
– Let 1 ≤ u1 < u2 < · · · < uA ≤ N be the elements of U . For i /∈ [A], ui
denotes u(i modA).
– Let the input of δIEEE be the concatenation of two vectors x,y ∈ [-1/2, 1/2)N .






0 if i /∈ U
s(xuj , yuj , yuj+1 , yuj+3 , yuj+7 , yuj+12) if i = uj
where s(a0, . . . , a5) =
 1 if ai < 0 for all i−1 if ai > 0 for all i
0 otherwise
Gaussian Sampling. Gentry et al. [8] described the first provably secure coun-
termeasure: Gaussian sampling. In previous schemes, the distribution of s −m
was related to the secret key. In [8], the distribution becomes independent of
the secret key: it is some discrete Gaussian distribution, which gives rise a to a
security proof in the random-oracle model, under the assumption that finding
close vectors is hard in the NTRU lattice. Unfortunately, this countermeasure
is not very competitive in practice: the sampling algorithm [18] is much less ef-
ficient than NTRUSign generation, and the new signature is less close to the
message, which forces to increase parameters. But its efficiency has recently been
improved, see [26,6].
3 Learning a Zonotope: Breaking NTRUSign with
Perturbations
In Sect. 3.1, we introduce the hidden zonotope problem (HZP), which is a natu-
ral generalization of the hidden parallelepiped problem (HPP), required to break
NTRUSign with perturbations. In Sect. 3.2, we explain why the Nguyen-Regev
HPP algorithm (Alg. 3) can heuristically solve the HZP, in cases that include
NTRUSign, provided that Step 5 is slightly modified. Yet, the approximations
obtained by the algorithm are expected to be worse than in the non-perturbed
case, so we use a folklore meet-in-the-middle algorithm for BDD in NTRU lat-
tices, which is described in [5]. Finally, in Sect. 3.3, we present experimental
results with our optimized NR attack which show that NTRUSign with one
(or slightly more) perturbation(s) is completely insecure, independently of the
type of basis. In particular, we completely break the original NTRUSign pro-
posed to IEEE P1363 standardization [4]: only one half of the parameter sets
was previously broken in [23].
3.1 The Hidden Zonotope Problem
Assume that one applies k − 1 NTRUSign perturbations as a countermea-
sure, which corresponds to k NTRUSign lattices L1, . . . , Lk (with secret bases
R1, . . . , Rk) where only Lk is public. One signs a hashed message m ∈ Zn
by computing s1 ∈ L1 such that s1 − m ∈ 12P(R1), then s2 ∈ L2 such that
s2 − s1 ∈ 12P(R2), . . . , and finally sk ∈ Lk such that sk − sk−1 ∈ 12P(Rk). It
follows that sk is somewhat close to m, because sk−m is in the Minkowski sum
1
2P(R1)+ 12P(R2)+· · ·+ 12P(Rk), which is a zonotope spanned by 12R1, . . . , 12Rk.
And heuristically, the distribution of 2(sk −m) is the convolution of all the k
uniform distributions DP(Ri). In other words, similarly to the perturbation-free
case, an attacker wishing to recover the secret key of a GGH-type signature
scheme using perturbations using a polynomial number of signatures is faced
with the following problem with m = kn:
Problem 2 (The Hidden Zonotope Problem or HZP) Let m ≥ n be in-
tegers, and V = [v1, . . . ,vm] be an m × n row matrix of rank n. The in-
put to the HZP is a sequence of poly(n,m) independent samples from D =
DZ(V ) over Rn, which is the convolution distribution over the zonotope Z(V ) =
{∑mi=1 xivi,−1 ≤ xi ≤ 1} spanned by V . The goal is to find a good approxima-
tion of the rows of ±V .
Here, we assume V to have rank n, because this is the setting of NTRUSign
with perturbation, and because the HPP is simply the HZP with m = n.
3.2 Extending the Nguyen-Regev Analysis to Zonotopes
Here, we study the behavior of the original Nguyen-Regev algorithm for learning
a parallelepiped ( SolveHPP(X ), Alg. 3) on a HZP instance, that is, when the
secret matrix V is not necessarily square, but is an arbitrary m × n matrix of
rank n with m ≥ n. To do this, we need to change the analysis of Nguyen and
Regev [23], and we will have to slightly change Alg. 3 to make the attack still
work: Alg. 4 is the new algorithm. Recall that the input distribution DZ(V ) is
formed by
∑m
i=1 xivi where the xi’s are uniformly chosen in [−1, 1]. We study
how the two stages of the NR attack behave for DZ(V ).
Morphing Zonotopes. We start with a trivial adaptation of Lemma 1 to zono-
topes:
Lemma 3. Let V be an m×n matrix over R of rank n. Let G be the symmetric
definite positive matrix V tV . Then:
– Cov(DZ(V )) = G/3.
– If L ∈ GLn(R) satisfies LLt = G−1 and we let C = V L, then CtC = In and
DZ(V ) · L = DZ(C).
Lemma 3 shows that if we apply Morphing(X ) (Alg. 1) to samples from DZ(V )
(rather than DP(V )), the output transformation L will be such that DZ(V ) ·L is
close to DZ(C) for some m× n matrix C such that CtC = In.
In other words, the effect of Step. 2 in SolveHPP(X ) (Alg. 3) is to make
the zonotope matrix V have orthonormal columns: V tV = In. The following
lemma gives elementary properties of such matrices, which will be useful for our
analysis:
Lemma 4. Let V be an m × n row matrix [v1, . . . ,vm] such that V tV = In.
Then:
– ‖w‖2 = ∑mi=1 〈w,vi〉2 for all w ∈ Rn.
– ‖vi‖ ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
–
∑m
i=1 ‖vi‖2 = n and Expx←U(Sn)(‖xV V t‖2) = n/m.
Learning an “Orthogonal” Zonotope. Nguyen and Regev [23] used the target
function momD,4(w) = Ex←D[〈x,w〉4] for w ∈ Sn, D = DP(V ) and V ∈ On(R)
to recover the hidden hypercube. We need to study this function when D is
the zonotope distribution D = DZ(V ) to recover the hidden zonotope. Nguyen
and Regev [23] gave elementary formulas for momD,4 and ∇momD,4 when D =
DP(V ) and V ∈ On(R), which can easily be adapted to the zonotope distribution
DZ(V ) if V tV = In, as follows:
Lemma 5. Let V be a m× n matrix over R such that V tV = In, and D be the
















〈vi,w〉3 vi if w ∈ Sn
Corollary 1. Under the same hypotheses as Lemma 5, the minima over Sn
of the function momD,4(w) are the maxima (over Sn) of f(w) =
∑m
i=1 fvi(w)
where fv(w) = 〈v,w〉4 is defined over Rn.
In [23, Lemma 3], Nguyen and Regev used Lagrange multipliers to show that
when V ∈ On(R), the local minima of momDP(V ),4 were located at ±v1, . . . ,vn,
and these minima are clearly global minima. However, this argument breaks
down when V is a rectangular m× n matrix of rank n such that V tV = In. To
tackle the zonotope case, we use a different argument, which requires to study
each function fvi(w) = 〈vi,w〉4 individually:
Lemma 6. Let v ∈ Rn and fv(w) = 〈v,w〉4 for w ∈ Rn . Then:
1. The gradient and Hessian matrix of fv are ∇fv(w) = 4 〈w,v〉3 · v and
H fv(w) = 12 〈w,v〉2 · vtv.
2. There are only two local maxima of fv over Sn, which are located at ±v/‖v‖,
and their value is ‖v‖4.
3. The local minima of fv over Sn are located on the hyperplane orthogonal to
v, and their value is 0.
4. The mean value of fv over Sn is 3‖v‖4/(n(n+ 2)).
This already gives a different point of view from Nguyen and Regev in the special
case where V ∈ On(R): for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, vj is a local maximum of fvj and a
local minimum of fvi for all i 6= j because vi ⊥ vj ; and therefore ±v1, . . . ,vn
are local extrema of momU·V,4.
In the general case where V is an m × n matrix such that V tV = In, let
di = vi/ ‖vi‖ ∈ Sn for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The direction dj is a local maximum
of fvj over Sn. On the other hand, fvi(dj) is likely to be small for i 6= j.
This suggests that dj should be very close to a local maximum of the whole
sum
∑m
i=1 fvi(dj), provided that the local maximum ‖vj‖4 of fvj is somewhat
larger than
∑
i 6=j fvi(dj). In fact, this local maximum dj is intuitively shifted by
g/(2‖vj‖4) where g is the gradient of
∑m
i=1 fvi(dj) at dj , because this is exactly
what happens for its second-order Taylor approximation. This is formalized by
our main result, which provides a sufficient condition on V guaranteeing that a
given direction vj/‖vj‖ is close to a local minimum of momDZ(V ),4:
Theorem 3 (Local Minima for Zonotopes). Let V be a m× n matrix over
R such that V tV = In. Assume that there is α ≥ 1 such that V is α-weakly-
orthogonal, that is, its m rows satisfy for all i 6= j: |〈vi,vj〉| ≤ α ‖vi‖ ‖vj‖ /
√
n.












〈vj ,vi〉3 vi‖ (3)









over the unit sphere, the function momDZ(V ),4 has a local minimum at some











And the local minimum momDZ(V ),4(mj) discloses an approximation of ‖vj‖,
namely:∣∣∣∣momDZ(V ),4(mj)− (13 − 2‖vj‖415
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 215
(







Proof. (Sketch of the proof in [5]) Let B = {w ∈ Sn : ‖w − dj‖ < ε} be the
open ball of Sn of radius ε, where dj = vj/ ‖vj‖ ∈ Sn Notice that for all w ∈ Sn:
‖w − dj‖2 = ‖w‖2 + ‖dj‖2 − 2 〈w,dj〉 = 2(1− 〈w,dj〉).
Therefore B = {w ∈ Sn : 〈dj ,w〉 > 1− ε2/2}, whose closure and boundary are
denoted respectively by B¯ and ∂B. Recall that f = ∑mi=1 fvi . We will prove the
following property:
∀w ∈ ∂B, f(w) < f(dj), (4)
which allows to conclude the proof of Th. 3. Indeed, by continuity, the restriction
of f to B¯ has a global maximum at some point mj ∈ B¯. And (4) implies that
mj 6∈ ∂B, therefore mj ∈ B. Thus, m is a global maximum of f over the
open set B: in other words, mj is a local maximum of f , and therefore a local
minimum of momD,4. Furthermore, by definition of B, we have: ‖mj − dj‖ < ε
















We now prove (4). Let w ∈ ∂B. To show f(dj)− f(w) > 0, we decompose it as:(






On the one hand, the left-hand term of (5) is:
fvj (dj)− fvj (w) = ‖vj‖4 − (1−
ε2
2
)4 ‖vj‖4 ≥ ε2 ‖vj‖4 (6)
because ε < 1/
√
2. On the other hand, we upper bound the right-hand term
of (5) by the Taylor-Lagrange formula, which states that there exists θ ∈ (0, 1)
such that
∑










H fvi(dj + θ(w − dj))(w − dj)t (7)
Let g =
∑
i 6=j ∇fvi(dj) = 4
∑
i 6=j 〈dj ,vi〉3 vi by Lemma 6. The left-hand term




〉∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε‖g‖. (8)
Using Lemma 6, the right-hand term of (7) can be bounded as:∣∣∣∣∣∣(w − dj)
∑
i6=j
H fvi(dj + θ(w − dj))(w − dj)t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12(α/√n+ ε)2ε2. (9)
Collecting (6), (7), (8) and (9), we obtain:
f(dj)− f(w) ≥
(














2. This is shown by tedious computations,
using weak-orthogonality and Lemma 4. uunionsq
Th. 3 states that under suitable assumptions on V (which we will discuss shortly),
if ‖vj‖ is not too small, then the secret direction vj/‖vj‖ is very close to a local
minimum of momDZ(V ),4, whose value discloses an approximation of ‖vj‖, be-
cause it is ≈ 13 − 215‖vj‖4. This suggests SolveHZP(X ) (Alg. 4) for learning a
zonotope: SolveHZP(X ) is exactly SolveHPP(X ) (Alg. 3), except that Step 5
of SolveHPP(X ) has been modified, to take into account that ‖vj‖ is no longer
necessarily equal to 1, but can fortunately be approximated by the value of the
local minimum.
First, we discuss the value of α in Th. 3 . Note that weak-orthogonality is a
natural property, as shown by the following basic result:
Lemma 7. Let v ∈ Sn and denote by X the random variable X = 〈v,w〉2 where
w has uniform distribution over Sn. Then X has distribution Beta(1/2, (n −
1)/2), Exp(X) = 1n , Exp(X
2) = 3n(n+2) , Exp(X
3) = 15n(n+2)(n+4) and more
generally: Exp(Xk) = k−1/2n/2+k−1 Exp(X
k−1).
Algorithm 4 SolveHZP(X ): Learning a Zonotope
Input: A set X of vectors x ∈ Rn sampled from DZ(V ), where V is an m× n matrix
of rank n.
Output: An approximation of some row vector of ±V .
1: L := Morphing(X ) using Alg. 1
2: X := X · L
3: Pick w uniformly at random from Sn
4: Compute r := Descent(X ,w, δ) ∈ Sn using Alg. 2: use δ = 3/4 in theory and
δ = 0.7 in practice.
5: Return λrL−1 where λ = (( 1
3
−momX ,4(r)) 152 )1/4
By studying more carefully the Beta distribution, it is possible to obtain strong
bounds. For instance, Ajtai [1, Lemma 47] showed that for all sufficiently large
n, if v ∈ Sn is fixed and w has uniform distribution over Sn, then | 〈v,w〉 | ≤
(log n)/
√
n with probability ≥ 1 − 1
n(logn)/2−1 . Since the probability is subex-
ponentially close to 1, this implies that if m = nO(1) and we assume that all
the directions vi/‖vi‖ are random, then V is (log n)-weakly orthogonal with
probability asymptotically close to 1.
This gives strong evidence that, if m = nO(1), the assumption on V in Th. 3
will be satisfied for α = log n. We can now discuss the remaining assumptions.
If α = log n, we may take any index j such that ‖vj‖ ≥ Ω(1/n13): in particular,
if ‖vj‖ = Ω(1), we may take ε = O(log3 n)/
√
n. And higher values of α can
be tolerated, as while as α = o(n1/6). Now recall that
∑m
i=1 ‖vi‖2 = n, thus
maxi ‖vi‖ ≥
√
n/m and ‖vi‖ is on average
√
n/m. In particular, if the number
of perturbations is constant, then m = O(n) and maxi ‖vi‖ ≥ Ω(1), therefore
Th. 3 applies to at least one index j, provided that α = o(n1/6). In fact, one can
see that the result can even tolerate slightly bigger values of m than Θ(n), such
as m = o(n7/6/ log n).
While Th. 3 explains why SolveHZP(X ) (Alg. 4) can heuristically solve the
HZP, it is not a full proof, as opposed to the simpler parallelepiped case. The
obstructions are the following:
– First, we would need to prove that the distance is sufficiently small to enable
the recovery of the original zonotope vectors, using an appropriate BDD
solver. Any error on vj/‖vj‖ is multiplied by L−1‖vj‖. In [23], the error on
vj could be made polynomially small for any polynomial, provided that the
number of samples was (polynomially) large enough. But ε cannot be chosen
polynomially small for any arbitrary polynomial in Th. 3.
– Second, we would need to prove that Descent(X ,w, δ) (Alg. 2) finds a ran-
dom local minimum of momDZ(V ),4 in polynomial time, even in the presence
of noise to compute momDZ(V ),4. Intuitively, this is not unreasonable since
the function momDZ(V ),4 is very regular, but it remains to be proved.
– Finally, we would need to prove that there are no other local minima, or at
least, not too many of them.
Regarding the third obstruction, it is easy to prove the following weaker state-
ment, which implies that global minima of momDZ(V ),4 over the unit sphere are
close to some direction vj/‖vj‖:
Lemma 8. Let V be a m× n matrix over R such that V tV = In, and D be the
distribution DZ(V ). Let w be a global maximum of f(w) =
∑m
i=1 fvi(w) over




We now report on experiments with the attack performed on NTRUSign, with
n up to 502. Our experiments are real-world experiments using signatures of
uniformly distributed messages.
Conditions of Th. 3. Our discussion following Th. 3 suggested that the matrix
V should be heuristically weakly-orthogonal for α = log n. In practice, we may
in fact take α ≈ 5 for both types of NTRUSign secret bases.
Regarding the norms ‖vi‖ after morphing, we experimentally verified that
‖vi‖ ≈
√
1/k where k is the number of perturbations for NTRUSign trans-
posed bases (see [5]), as expected by
∑m
i=1 ‖vi‖2 = n. But for the so-called
standard bases, the situation is a bit different: half of the ‖vi‖’s are very small,
and the remaining half are close to
√
2/k. This can be explained by the fact
that standard bases are unbalanced: half of the vectors are much shorter than
the other vectors.
For a number of perturbations ≤ 8, we experimentally verified that the “gra-
dient” g = 4‖vj‖3 ‖
∑
i6=j 〈vj ,vi〉3 vi‖ appearing in the conditions of Th. 3 satisfies
‖g‖ = O(1/n) with a small constant ≤ 4 (see [5]).
To summarize, the conditions of Th. 3 are experimentally verified for a num-
ber of perturbations ≤ 8: for all vectors vj ’s in the case of transposed bases, and
for half of the vectors vj ’s in the case of standard bases.
Modifications to the original NR attack. We already explained that the orig-
inal NR algorithm SolveHPP(X ) (Alg. 3) had to be slightly modified into
SolveHZP(X ) (Alg. 4): more precisely, Step 5 is modified.
However, because Th. 3 states that the secret direction might be perturbed
by some small ε, we also implemented an additional modification: instead of the
elementary BDD algorithm by rounding, we used in the final stage a special BDD
algorithm tailored for NTRU lattices, which is a tweaked version of Odlyzko’s
meet-in-the-middle attack on NTRU described in [15]. Details are given in [5].
Practical cryptanalysis. We first applied successfully the optimized NR-attack on
the original NTRUSign-251 scheme with one perturbation (which corresponds
to a lattice dimension of 502), as initially submitted to the IEEE P1363 standard:
about 8,000 signatures were sufficient to recover the secret key, which should be
compared with the 400 signatures of the original attack [23] when there was no
perturbation. This means that the original NTRUSign-251 scheme [10] is now
completely broken.
Furthermore, we performed additional experiments for varying dimension
and number of perturbations, for the parameters proposed in the latest NTRU
article [13], where transposed bases are used. Table 1 summarizes the results
obtained: each successful attack took less than a day, and the MiM error recovery
algorithm ran with less than 8Gb of memory.
Table 1. Experiments with the generalized NR-attack on the latest NTRUSign pa-
rameters [13]
Security level : dimension n Toy : 94 80-bit : 314 112-bit : 394 128-bit : 446
0 perturbation 300:(0,1) 400:(0,1) 400:(0,1) 600:(0,1)
1 perturbation 1000:(1,2) 5000:(0,1) 4000:(0,1) 4000:(0,0)
2 perturbations 10000:(5,3) 12000:(0,2)
3 perturbations 12000:(5,4)
4 perturbations 100000:(0,1)
In this table, each non-empty cell represents a successful attack for a given transposed
basis (the column indicates the security level and the dimension) and number of per-
turbations (row). These cells have the form s : (e = ‖F ‖1 , w = ‖G‖∞) where s is
the number of signatures used by the learning algorithm, and where (F |G) is the
error vector of the best approximation given by a descent. The running time of our
MiM-Algorithm is about (n/2)de/2e+1 for such small w.
Our experiments confirm our theoretical analysis: NTRUSign with a con-
stant number of perturbations is insecure, but we see that the number of signa-
tures required increases with the number of perturbations.
4 Learning a Deformed Parallelepiped: Breaking the
IEEE-IT Countermeasure
In this section, we show that the deformation suggested in [16] is unlikely to
prevent the NR attack [23]. More generally, we show that the NR attack heuris-
tically still works if the deformation is only partial, which means that it preserves
at least one of the canonical axes, namely there exists at least one index i such
that:
– for all x ∈ [-1/2, 1/2)n, [δ(x)]i = 0
– δ(x) is independent of xi : (∀j 6= i, xj = yj)⇒ δ(x) = δ(y)
Such an index i is said to be ignored by the deformation δ. And it is clear that
δIEEE is partial by definition (see Sect. 2.5), because it ignores exactly all index
i /∈ U . Our main result is the following, whose proof is given in [5].
Theorem 4. Let δ be a partial deformation, and i be an index ignored by δ. Let
D = 2·dδ(Un) and M ∈ GLn(R) be an invertible matrix and G = Cov(D·M). Let
L be such that LLt = G−1. Then r = 1√
3
·miL is a local minimum of mom4,D′(·)
over the unit sphere, where D′ = D ·M · L.
While this is a strong theoretical argument supporting why the NR attack
still works, it is not a full proof, for reasons similar to the zonotope case (see the
previous section): there may be other minima, and we did not prove that the
gradient descent efficiently finds minima.
Experimental results The attack was run, using 300,000 signatures, to recover
the secret key in 80-bit, 112-bit and 128-bit NTRUSign security level settings,
and each run led to a secret key recovery, in about two days. No other local min-
imum was found. Though the samples no longer belong to a set stable by NTRU
symmetry group SNTRUN , we may still try to apply the symmetry trick, to multi-
ply the number of samples by N , like in [23]. This modifies the distribution of the
sample to the average of its orbit : SNTRUN (D) = σ(x) : x← D, σ ← U(SNTRUN ).
It turns out that applying the attack on such an averaged distribution leads
once again to descents converging to some basis vectors: in fact, by symmetry,
all of them are equally likely. The attack used 2,000 signatures, and ran in less
than an hour, on the same basis. Intuitively, this averaging strongly reduces
the co-dependence between the coordinates of x ← Dσ, making the resulting
distribution much closer to a parallelepiped than D.
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